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ABSTRACT
We address the following question: given a domain of asymmetric information
economies, is it always possible to design a mechanism so that all of its
equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational-efficient or
interim envy- free-efficient in the domain? We show that if the solution concept
were that of Bayesian equilibrium, the answer is no. It is known that in
complete information economies such games can always be constructed. Can this
gap be filled by "mechanisms with no regret" : games that leak information
endogenously without enlarging the equilibrium set. We adopt two approaches.
First, we introduce a theory of "cheap play". This is a natural model of
mechanisms with no regret. Regret- free cheap play is shown to be characterized
by posterior implementability (Green and Laffont (1987)). The second is an
extreme approach characterized by an ex post viewpoint (as in Cremer and McLean
(1985)). Both approaches yield an impossibility result. Information leakage
does not recover efficiency.

1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the following critical question: Suppose
that a domain of asymmetric information economies is given. Is it always
possible, in this domain, to design a mechanism so that all of its
equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational-efficient or
interim fair (envy-free-efficient)?
Our first result is: if the solution concept were that of Bayesian
equilibrium, we can never design such a game in a wide domain of economies.
The impossibility result persists even if there were strong restrictions on
the information structure guaranteeing incentive compatibility of any
allocation rule.
It is known from the Nash-implementation literature (Maskin (1977),
Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984)) that in complete information
economies such games can always be constructed. Our impossibility results
indicate the cost, in terms of social welfare, imposed on society by the
presence of information asymmetry. In light of the sharp contrast between
the positive results under complete information and the negative ones under
asymmetric information, a natural question arises: can this gap be filled
by developing games that not only allocate resources but also "leak"
information endogenously? In equilibrium, the players' optimality
calculations are conditioned on the newly acquired information.
Superficially, it seems that such games may yield a solution to the problem
of non-existence of efficient mechanisms. Also, the game designer
typically has the power to modify the rules of the game to suit its
objectives and could conceivably devise such a game.
Information leakage is a mixed blessing since, typically, it would
require some pre-play communication. The prospects of achieving our
objectives look rather gloomy if communication in the form of cheap talk
were permitted — it would enlarge the set of equilibria. Our negative
findings using Bayesian equilibrium were primarily due to the fact that
there were "too many" equilibria in every conceivable game that could be
constructed. Clearly, we need a game that leaks information and whose
equilibrium set is small relative to the set of Bayesian equilibria of the
same game. We refer to games with these features as mechanisms with no
regret.
Unfortunately, there is no well established theory of such games that
we can turn to. In this paper, we shall develop a theory of cheap play
which is the most natural route to mechanisms with no regret.
Consider a game in which there are several (say T) rounds of play such
that the actions chosen in the first T -1 rounds constitute cheap play. In
other words, these actions are non-binding and are payoff-irrelevant.
Actions taken in each round are observable to all players at the end of the
round. The actions chosen in the final, T-th, round determine payoffs and
are binding commitments. A cheap play equilibrium is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the induced game. A regret-free cheap play equilibrium
(RFCPE) is a cheap play equilibrium that has a stationarity property — the
players do not revise their strategies over time. Since the optimality of
the T-th round strategies must be conditioned upon information acquired by
the equilibrium actions of the previous rounds, one may expect that the set
of RFCPE is rather small (and even empty for some games). It is shown that
RFCPE of a game with T- 1 rounds of cheap play is in fact a refinement of
Bayesian equilibrium defined for the same game with no rounds of cheap
play.
The number of rounds of cheap play may be decided by the designer. We
study the following question: Is it possible to appropriately choose T and
design a mechanism with T -1 rounds of cheap play so that all of its RFCPE
outcomes are either interim individually rational-efficient or interim
fair?
Given the complex nature of an RFCPE, the first step towards answering
the question above is to make the problem more tractable. We show that
there is a simple characterization of RFCPE in terms of Bayesian equilibria
that are posterior implementable. The latter concept was first introduced
by Green and Laffont (1987) to study mechanisms with no regret. Their
definition of posterior implementability is not derived from an explicit
model of a game with a sequence of cheap play prior to a binding move.
Green and Laffont's model is not rich enough to capture two critical
features of the problem: (i) the possibility of misleading play in early
rounds; and (ii) later round strategies spaces are richer than those in
early rounds since the strategies chosen later are not restricted to being
measurable with respect to the initial information structures. Our
characterization provides a justification for focusing on posterior
implementable equilibria via an explicit model of sequential strategy
choice.
In the next step, we directly address the question posed above, given
the characterization of RFCPE in terms of posterior implementability. The
answer, however, still turns out to be negative despite the information
leakage and equilibrium refinement facilitated by cheap play.
Our negative findings are obtained using one natural method of
modelling mechanisms with no regret. Clearly, there may be other natural
ways of devising such mechanisms. To what extent do we expect the
impossibility theorems to generalize? To answer such a question, we adopt
an ex post standpoint a la Cramer and McLean (1985).
The approach taken by Cremer and McLean (1985) (which is also that of
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) and d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1982)) is as
follows. It is common knowledge among the agents that preliminary strategy
choices may be modified at a later stage after observing the choices of
others. In anticipation of such recontracting possibilities, the agents
focus only on those Bayesian equilibria that display the strongest
conceivable no regret feature. No agent regrets his/her strategy choice
after the observation of actual actions chosen by others. Optimality of
strategies is checked using every possible refinement of information.
Despite the fact that we use an extreme form of a mechanism with no
regret, the negative results are not overturned — there are still "too
many" equilibria in any game we can design. This would cast doubt on the
abilities of any alternative construction of mechanisms with no regret to
generate equilibria which are all interim individually rational-efficient
or fair.
The essential steps underlying the proofs of the impossibility results
are as follows. For every solution concept, we establish a necessary
condition for the existence of the appropriate mechanism. Next, we show
that in each case a domain of economies exists that violates the necessary
condition.
These results should be compared to the disappointing findings of
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987a) regarding the impossibility of fully
Bayesian implementing the interim efficiency performance standard in a wide
domain of economies. Our inquiry begins with the question of Bayesian
implementation as opposed to full Bayesian implementation. The latter
concept requires that the set of equilibrium outcomes of a mechanism must
coincide with the set of outcomes specified by a performance standard. The
former only requires a containment of the first set in the second.
Despite the strongly negative nature of Palfrey and Srivastava's
conclusions they are not negative enough. Their findings do not
automatically provide an answer to the question posed at the beginning of
this section. It would still be possible to Bayesian-implement, as opposed
to fully Bayesian-implement, the efficiency standard or one of its subsets.
For example, a mechanism that gives all the resources of every economy to a
single individual would, albeit trivially, implement the efficiency
standard in the domain of economies with strictly monotonic preferences.
We explore the question of Bayesian-implementability of any subset of the
interim efficiency standard that meets the natural restrictions of
individual rationality or fairness.
2. The Model and Notation
The paper is organized as follows: This section presents the model.
Section 3 presents cheap play and equilibria with no regret. Sections 4
and 5 contain results on implementation of the welfare norms under
alternative equilibrium concepts. Section 6 presents an ex post approach
to the problem. The final section concludes.
An asymmetric information economy, e, is a triple {L, N, Q}. L is a
set of goods, N is a set of agents and 9 is a set of states of the world.
All of these sets are non-empty and finite and the cardinalities of L and N
are given by I and n, respectively. & is the domain of all asymmetric
information economies. In the definitions that follow, we focus on a given
e € &. An explicit reference to e is dropped to minimize notational
burden.
Let e = {L, N, 8} be given. Every agent i € N is characterized by a
* I
list (u , 0) , II
, q ), where u : OR X 9 -> OR is agent i's von
i I 1 m i + &
£
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; o> (* 0) € OR is agent i's initial
endowment of goods; IT is agent i's natural information partition of 8 and
*
q : 8 -> (0, 11 is agent i's prior probability distribution on 8. Each
i
constituent of this list is assumed to be given exogenously, and is common
knowledge in the sense of Aumann (1976). Let the function I : -» II be
i i
defined by I°(0) <0' € 8: there exists n € TT such that e, 0' <= tt }.J
i 11 i
The latter is agent i's natural information set in state 0. By "natural"
information we refer to the information structure that the agent is
exogenously endowed with. This distinguishes it from the information that
can be acquired endogenously. In the sequel, for any set X , let X =
I
X X . In addition, unless specified otherwise, x = (x ) and x =
i€N 1 r i i€N -1
(x)
j j€N\<l>
p
A = {z € OR : Y z < Y cj}is the set of feasible allocations. A
state-contingent allocation is a random variable f:Q-*A. F is the domain
of such functions. A performance standard <p is a non-empty subset of F. $
is the class of all performance standards.
Let P(X) denote the set of non-empty subsets of X. Agent i's
posterior probability distribution is the function q : 8 x P(8) -> (0, 1]
defined by Bayes' Law, i.e. for all e 8 and for all 9 € P(8),
*
q (0) if € 9;
q/e, 9 ) = v€* ^
{Q,)
0, otherwise.
Agent i's expected utility from f e F, given 9 e P(I (6)) is £ q (0',
1
e'e?
1
5)u (/ (6'), 8'), and is written more compactly as EU (/ 9). Agent i's
9-expected lower contour set at f is given by EL (f 9) = {g e F: EU (f
9) > EU(g | 9)).
The domain under consideration, &, is the collection of all economies
e = {L, N, 0} that satisfy the following:
(Non-redundancy of states) V9 € 6, r\ I°(e) = {9}.
A mechanism is a game (form) T = {N, M, £}, where, given that M is
i
agent i's message (or action) space, M = XM ; and £: M -> A is an outcome
function. Agent i's strategy is a random variable s : 8 -> M such that s
i i i
is IT -measurable. Let S be the domain of such functions.
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3. Equilibria with No Regret
The fundamental solution concept for games with asymmetric information
is that of Bayesian equilibrium due to Harsanyi (1967). This concept is
defined as follows:
Definition I: s € S is a Bayesian equilibrium of T = {N , M, £} if Vi € N,
VG e 8, Vs' 6 S
,
1 i
£°(s\ s ) € EL(£°s I I°(Q)).l-l l ' l
Let £°(r) denote the set of Bayesian equilibria of V and E°(D {£<>s <= F:
s
€ E°(D, r = {N, M, £».
In this paper, we shall also be interested in modelling situations
where agents choose equilibria that satisfy a criterion of absence of
regret after observation of the "equilibrium actions" taken by all agents.
We shall introduce an equilibrium concept derived from a natural extension
of the underlying game. Such an extension allows for several rounds of
strategic choice. We shall refer to the concept as cheap play equilibrium.
Let T be some finite number chosen by the game designer. There are T
rounds of simultaneous-move strategy choice in the extended game.
Strategies chosen in the early rounds are not binding. It is only in the
T-th round that a strategy is a binding commitment. In every round, every
agent observes the actions chosen by all agents in the previous rounds.
Only the T-th round actions are payoff-relevant.
Given a game T = {N, M, £}, the T-stage cheap play extension of Y is a
T T Tgame T = {N, M , £,} where M is the T-fold product of M and £: M -> A is an
outcome function that associates every action profile chosen in the T-th
stage with an outcome in A. Let M be the t-fold product of M for all t €
U, ..., T>. Agent i's strategy in T is a T-tuple of random variables
(s ) where s € S and for all t € {2, .... T>, s : 8 x M " -> M with
i t=i 11 i i
s {•, m ) being IT -measurable for all m e M Let S be the domain
i i i
T T T t T
of agent i's strategies in Y and S = x S . We shall write (s ) asto to 1€N 1 i 1 = 1
T T T
[s ] and (s ) as [s ]. Given that for all J € N, and for all t e
1 1 i€N
{1,..., T}, s is the strategy being employed, we write agent i's action
T T T-l
resulting from [s ] being applied in state € 8 as s {B, [s (0,
[s
T"2
(. ..)]]) € M. Also for all [sT ] € S1', i € N, and all [sT ] € ST
,
[s
T
,
1 i i
S ] = (S , S ) , S (0, [s (0, [S (...)]]) S (s (0, [S (0,
-l 1 -1 t = l i
[s
T "2
(. ..)]])) € M and £o[sT l = ^CsV, [sT_1 (-, [sT
"2
(... ))]]).
For all i
€ JV, V9 € 8, Vt 6 (2,...Th J (G, [s
1
]) = (B' e I°(B): Vt'
such that 1 < V < t, sV(&, •) = s
t
'(B', ') and s
1
(B) = s
1
(B')}.
-i -l -i -l
T T T T
Definition 2: [s ] € S is a cheap play equilibrium of Y = {N, M , %} if
Vi e N, V0
€ 8, V[s
T
] e S
T
,
EU(Zo[sT , s1
^] | 1(Q, [i
T
. s
T
})) * EU^ois1 }
I
I(Q, [sT])).
IT TIT
Let E (T ) denote the set of cheap play equilibria of T and E (r ) =
<Z°[s
T
] € F: [s
T
] € eV7 ), TT = {AT, MT , *;>}.
Observe that in a game with cheap play, a unilateral deviation by an
agent not only affects the outcome (if the deviating strategy is different
from the stratus quo in the T-th stage) but also affects the information
set observable to the agent in the T-th stage. The latter follows from the
fact that other agents' strategies in each stage depend on the actions they
have observed in previous stages which in turn has an effect on the
information set that the deviating agent observes in the final stage.
For any T, E°(D Q E l {rT ). Choose s e E°(D. To check that £o S is
T
also a cheap play equilibrium outcome, consider the strategy profile in T
in which each agent chooses the same action in every state and every stage
prior to T. The constant nature of the early rounds of strategy choice
ensures that no agent refines his/her information set in any stage no
matter what actions the agent observes. In stage T, each agent i chooses
an action using the function s . A unilateral deviation from the strategy
just constructed affects outcomes but not the deviator's information set in
stage T. Since s is a Bayesian equilibrium of T, the strategy choice just
constructed for T is a cheap play equilibrium. This is an uninformative
cheap play equilibrium and yields the same outcome as £;°s.
We shall focus on a refinement of the set of cheap play equilibria
that have a "no regret" feature. In other words, these equilibria yield
actions chosen in the initial stage whose optimality remains intact in
later stages even after information leakage and, therefore, are not revised
over time.
T T TDefinition 3: [s ] € S is a regret-free cheap play equilibrium of f if
10
[s
T
] e E\rT ) and is stationary, i.e. Vi € N, V9 € 9, Vt e {2 T>,
s'O) = s|(e f [st_1 (e, [st_2 (. ..)]]).
2 T T
Let £ (T ) denote the set of regret-free cheap play equilibria of T and
E*(rT ) = <€o[sT ] e F: [sT ] € E2(rT ), r
T
= {n, m
t
, €»•
The notion of a T-stage extension of a game and the corresponding
equilibrium concepts are clearly cumbersome. In addition, we would like to
find out the logical relationship between £ (T ) and E (D. Next, we shall
show that the set of regret-free cheap play equilibrium outcomes of T have
a simple characterization and is a subset of £ (D. In fact, it is
F
precisely the subset that has been identified as "posterior implementable"
by Green and Laffont (1987). A weakness of Green and Laffont's concept is
that it was not rationalized via a well specified modification of the rules
of play of a game. The equivalence result given below provides a
justification for focusing on posterior implementable equilibrium as a
solution concept for mechanisms with no regret.
Green and Laffont's refinement of Bayesian equilibrium is defined as
follows.
Definition 4: s € S is a posterior implementable equilibrium of T = {N, M,
O if Vi € N, V9 € 6, Vs' € S ,•3 '
1 i'
£°(s' ( s ) e EL(£oS I I(Q, s))
^
i -l l ^ i i
where 1(9, s) a {9' <= I°(8): s(9) = s(9')>.
l l
3
Let E (D denote the set of posterior implementable equilibria of T and
E
3(D = {£oS € F: s e E3(D, r = {N, M, £»•
F
2 T 3Lemma 1: For any finite number T > 1, E [T ) = E (D.
Proof: First, we shall check that for any T > 1, E
2
(T
T
) Q E
3
(D. Choose
F F
T 2 T 1
[s ] € E (f ). For all i € N and all 9 e 9, by IT -measurability of s , we
11
have s
l
(6) = s*(0') for all 9' e I°(0). By stationarity of [s
T
], s
T
(«,
i i l I
T-l T-2
[s (•, [s (...))]]) is IT -measurable for all i. A second implication
of stationarity of [s
T
] is that for all i € A/, 6 € 9, and e' e I°(0),
s
1
^'; = s
2
(9', s
l
(B')) = s
2
(Q', s
2
(Q', s\e')), s l(Q')) = ... = sT (6,
-i -1 -1 i
[s
T_1
(e, [s
T_2
(. ..))]]). Hence, 1(6, [sT]) = I (Q, s1). For all i € N,
T *T
since [si is a cheap play equilibrium, there is no deviation [s ] such
i
*t t
that for all t < T. s = s , which makes t better off than in equilibrium.
l i
n
Also, for all i € N and all [s ] such that for all t < T, s = s , for all
l i l
~
-f T 1 T
G e 8, I C0, /s , s ]) = 1(9, s ). Thus, by II -measurability of s (•,
i l -i 1 1 i
T-l T-2
[s (, [s (...))!]) for all i e Af and by definition of posterior13 T Timplementable equilibrium, s e E (D. By stationarity of [s ], £°[s ] =
3 T 2 3
Conversely, to show that E (T ) £ £ (r), choose s e E (D. Define
[s
T
] e S
T
such that for all i € A/, for all € 8, s (9) = s
1
{6) and for all
t
€ {2,..., T}, for all m e M, s (0, m ) = s (0). By the stationary
T T T-l T-2
nature of [s ], we have II -measurability of s (•, [s (•, [s (...))]]).
l
'
i
This also implies that 7 (0, [s ]) = J (0, s ) for all i e N and € 8.
l l
T *T T
Also, by construction of [s ], for all i € A/, € 8 and all [s ] € S
,
i
~
~T T 1 3
7.(0, [s , s 1) = J (0, s ). Hence, if s <= E (D, then by definition ofTIT T
cheap play equilibrium, [s ] € E (T ). By construction, [s ] is stationary
T T
and, therefore, is also regret-free. By construction of [s ], £°[s ] =
£°s.
Given this simple characterization of regret-free cheap play
equilibria, we shall concentrate on the set E (D in obtaining solutions to
the game f . If T is such that E3(D * 0, then TT is referred to as a
mechanism with no regret.
12
4. Efficiency, Individual Rationality and Fairness
under Bayesian Equilibrium
The classical approach to welfare economics has been to identify the
subset of allocations that are Pareto-efficient within the set of all
physically and technologically feasible allocations. Among these efficient
allocations, attention is generally focused on ones that are either
individually rational or "fair" according to some equity criterion. The
concern for individual rationality is based on the presumption that initial
endowments are specified. This property provides the motivation to agents
to participate in the resource allocation mechanism. Alternatively, a
measure of equity is applied. The most frequently used criterion is that
of envy-freeness due to Foley (1967).
In asymmetric information economies, these welfare evaluations must
also take account of informational constraints — an uninformed social
planner cannot identify the individually rational-efficient or fair
allocations in the absence of complete information about the agents'
preferences. The criteria are thus extended to provide the appropriate
level of insurance associated with the timing of the welfare analysis (see
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) for a detailed discussion). The most
compelling and widely used timing for an analysis of efficiency is
associated with the interim stage of decision-making. The focus of our
welfare analysis will be on this stage. The ex ante timing provides too
much and the ex post timing provides too little insurance to agents after
they have received their private information. The appropriate criteria are
defined as follows:
Definition 5: / e F is interim-efficient if there is no g € F such that Vi
13
€ N t VG e 9, / € EL (g \ I°(e)) and / € int(EL (g | I°(0)) for some i € A/
and some 6 € 9.
Definition 6: Let w € F defined by w{Q) = w for all € 9. Let 7> l a {/ €
F: / is interim efficient and Vi € A/, V9 € 9, w € £L (/ I°(Q))} denote
the set of interim individually rational-efficient state-contingent
allocations.
Definition 7: For all i, J € N and all / € F, let f
i}
= (g e F: g = f , g
i j J
= f and Vk € WVi, j}, g = f ). Let 9
l
a {/ e F: / is interim efficient
i k k
and Vi, j € Af, V9 € 9, /iJ € EL C/ I°(6))} denote the set o/ interim
envy-free-efficient (fair) state-contingent allocations.
Once a social planner decides on the appropriate refinement of
efficiency, the question of implementing an efficient performance standard
arises. Once again, the informational asymmetry poses a constraint. A
naive mechanism in which each agent is asked to report his/her private
information to the planner will generally not ensure truth-telling as the
unique equilibrium strategy profile. Thus, we need to be guaranteed the
existence of a mechanism that implements the given standard. This is
defined (for the case where Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept)
as follows:
Definition 8: A performance standard <p is Bayesian-implementable by V in e
= {L, N, Q} if * £°(r) £ <p.
F
A performance standard <p is Bayesian implementable in £ (in a global
sense) if Ve <= &, 3T such that <p is Bayesian-implementable by T in e.
Remark: Full Bayesian-implementation of <p by T requires that E (D = <p,
whereas weak Bayesian-implementation of <p by T requires that <p n E°(D * 0.
Next, we present a condition that is necessary and, in a sub-class of
&, sufficient for a performance standard to be Bayesian-implementable.
14
Before we present the condition, some additional definitions are needed.
We shall use the approach of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey
and Srivastava (1987a) to define a "collection of compatible manipulation
operators".
Definition 9: A collection of compatible manipulation operators for TI
(CCMO), denoted a = (a ) , is defined by
1 i€N J
(i) Vi € N, a: IT -> IT
,
l i l
(ii) Vit
€
n, <fl K * 0> # <f) a (tt ) * 0>.
1 I€N i ' i€N 1 i
Let 8 : 8 -> be the deception induced by a and defined by (0) =
f\ a (I (0)). By the assumption of non-redundancy of states, is a
well-defined function.
Definition 10: A performance standard <p satisfies Property M if the
following is true:
3<p'€ <J> such that <p' Q (p and V/ e F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / 6 <p' and
(ii) Vi € N, Vg
€
F, V0
€ G, V0' = Qa(e), (g e EL(f I I°(Q'))} =*
i ' i
fgoe
a
e ELJfoe* | f(e))},
then foQ e <p*.
Remark: <p satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if the Property M is modified as
follows: V/
€ F, VCCMO's a, if (i)' and (ii)' imply /<>0
a
e <p, where (i)' /
€ <p and (ii)' is the same as (ii) in the definition above.
Fact 1: There exists <p € $ such that <p satisfies Property M and violates
Bayesian monotonicity.
To check that this true, simply choose <p such that it is the union of
a Bayesian monotonic set <p'
€
$ and a set <p" € $ which is not Bayesian
monotonic. For examples of such sets, see Palfrey and Srivastava (1987a).
Next, we define a condition on & which guarantees that every
15
performance standard is incentive compatible in every economy satisfying
the condition.
An economy e € & satisfies non-exclusivity of information (NEI) if it
has the following information structure:
vi
€ n, ve € e, n l°(e) = {e>.
J€N\< 1>
NEI
Let & denote the sub-class of 8 in which the NEI condition is met.
NEI
Fact 2: Let e = (L, N, B} be an economy in & .A performance standard <p
is fully Bayesian-implementable by a game in e if and only if it satisfies
Bayesian monotonicity
.
Proof: See Palfrey and Srivastava (1985).
The following proposition provides a parallel characterization of
Bayesian-implementability.
NEI
Proposition 1: Let e = (L, N, Q} be an economy in & A performance
standard <p is Bayesian-implementable by a game in e if and only if it
satisfies Property M.
Proof: <p is Bayesian-implementable if and only if there exists <p' € $ such
that <p' Q <p and <p' is fully Bayesian-implementable. Given Fact 2, the
proposition follows from the definitions.
In conjunction with the facts given above, the proposition has an
interesting implication: a performance standard may be
Bayesian-implementable even though it violates Bayesian monotonicity.
Palfrey and Srivastava's (1987) examples suggest that T 1 and T
e
may
not be fully Bayesian-implementable. However, disappointing as this may
be, we are interested in a more crucial question: is it possible to design
a mechanism so that all of its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either
16
individually rational-efficient or fair? In other words, is it possible to
Bayesian-implement (i.e. to fully Bayesian-implement some subset of) P or
T in a sufficiently rich domain of economies? The implications of Facts
1, 2 and Proposition 1 are that Palfrey and Srivastava's result does not
answer this latter question. The following results confirm that the answer
to the question is, indeed, negative.
The proofs are by way of counterexamples. We shall present simple
ones using linear economies. The negative result does not depend on the
assumption of linearity and hold for other utility specifications as well.
Observe that we have imposed the NEI restriction on the domain of
economies. This makes the negative nature of the results even more
pronounced.
Theorem 1: If <p Q T , then <p is not Bayesian-implementable in &
Proof: Consider the following example:
NFT
EXAMPLE 1: We define e = {L, N, 9} € 6 as follows. Let L = {X, Y} with
the quantities of the two goods being denoted by the corresponding lower
case letters. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4> and let 8 = {a, b, c). IT = IT = {(a),
1 2
(b), (c)} and IT = II = {(a), (b, c)>, i.e. agents 1 and 2 are fully
3 4
informed and agents 3 and 4 cannot distinguish between states b and c when
one of them occurs. An allocation z is written as {x
, y ) . w = ((0,
l i i€N
*
1), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 0)). Each state is equally likely, i.e. q (a) =
i
* *
i £
q (b) = q (c) = - for all t € N. u : R X -> R is given as follows:
i M 3 l + &
Vi
€ {1, 2>, V9 € 9, uiz , 9) = x + 2y ,
l l l
J
\
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u (z , e) =
3 3
(x + y ),
3 3
if e = a
0.25(x + y ) if 6 = b
3 J 3
0.75(x + y ) if G = c.
3 3
u (z , e) =
4 4
U
4
+ V' if 9 = a
0.75U + y ) if 9 = b
4 4
0.25(>: + y ) if e = c.
4 4
It can be checked that T * 0. Consider the following state-contingent
allocation, denoted / :
a b c
z = (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)
z = (0, 1)
2
(0, 1) (0, 1)
Z = (1, 0)
3
(0, 0) If. 0)
z = (1, 0)
4
(2, 0) C-, o)
It can be checked that / € T .
Choose any <p' € $ such that <p' Q <p Q T . We shall show that the
hypothesis of Property M is satisfied. Consider the function a : TT -> IT
i i i
for all i € N defined by a (rr ) = {a} for all i € N and all tt e IT . Thus,
i i i i
a is a CCMO and for all 9 e 8, a(0) = a. Pick / € <p' and g € F. Write
/(a) as (x, y) and gia) as (x\ y'). By construction, the utility
functions of agents 1 and 2 are state-independent. Therefore, given that
they are completely informed, the hypothesis of Property M is trivially
satisfied for these two agents. The following relationships imply that the
hypothesis of Property M is met for the remaining agents:
18
x + y £ x' + y' =» 0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x + y )] > 0.5[0.25(x' +
3 "*3 3 ^3 3 J 3 3 ^ 3 3
y') + 0.75(x' + y')].y
3 3 ^3
x + y > jc' + y' * 0.5[0.75(x + y ) + 0.25(x + y )] a 0.5[0.75(x' +
y') + 0.25(x' + y')].
4 4 4
For <p to satisfy Property M, we must have /«9 6 ^>\ /«8 recommends the
following allocation in states b and c for agents 3 and 4:
Agent 3 (x^ yj (x^ y^
Agent 4 (x y ) (x , y )
4 4 4 4
By interim individual rationality of /, (x
, y ) * (0, 0). By the
specification of the utility functions for agents 3 and 4 and given that /
e <p' Q T , we have x > and x > 0. Choose c such that min{x , x } > e >
3 4 3 4
0. Consider an alternative rule h e F defined by
h(a) = /(a),
Vi
€ {1, 2}, V9 € {b, c>, h(9) = /(a),
i i
h (b) = (x -e, y ), h (c) = (x +-, y ),
3 33 3 333
h (b) = (x +e, y ), h (c) = (x — , y ).
4 4 ^4 4 4 3 4
Thus, El/ (h I {b, c» = 0.5[0.25(x - e + y ) + 0.75(x + - + y )] «
3 ' 3 y 3 3 3 3
0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x + y )] = Et/ (/°9
a
I {b, c». Trivially, for i
3 3 3 3-3 '
€ {1, 2} and all 9 € 0, EU (h | {9}) = EU (/°G
a
| {9}). Also, trivially,
for i € {3, 4}, Et/ (h | {a}) = EU (/°9
a
| U». However, EU (h | {b, c>) =
0.5[0.75(x + c + y ) + 0.25(x - - + y )] > 0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x +4^4 4 3 4 4 J a, 4
y )] = EU (/o9
a
I <b, c». Thus, fo6
a
* ?\
4 4
Thus, <p violates Property M. By Proposition 1, it is not
Bayesian-implementable in e.
The arguments given in the example would be virtually unchanged if T
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e
*
e
were replaced with T . It may be checked that / given above belongs to T
as well. In addition, since / in the example is envy-free, we must have
(x
, y ) * (0, 0). Otherwise, in state a, agent 3 would envy at least one
other agent with a strictly positive allocation. By interim efficiency,
such an agent must exist. The example given above, therefore, proves the
following proposition.
Theorem 2: If <p Q T-, then <p is not Bayesian-implementable in 8
4. Efficiency, Individual Rationality and Fairness
under Regret Free Equilibrium
In this section, we explore the possibility of designing mechanisms
for implemention that permit several rounds of cheap play under the
assumption that the agents play regret-free cheap play equilibria. Given
Lemma 1, we have the following definition.
Definition 11: A performance standard <p is No regret-implementable
(NR-implementable) by FT in e = {L, N, Q} if * E3(D Q <p.
A performance standard <p is NR-implementable in & (in a global sense)
j
if Ve
€ &, 37 and T such that <p is NR-implementable by T in e.
T 3Remark: <p is fully NR-implementable by T in e if E (D = <p.
Next, we define an additional property of performance standards.
Definition 12: A performance standard cp satisfies Property Ml\r if the
following is true:
given T = iN, M, £}, 3<p' e $ such that <p' Q <p and V/ € F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / e <p'
20
(ii) 3s 6 £3(D such that £°s = / and Vi € N, Vg € F, V9 € 6, V9' =
e°Ye;, g € EL(f \ fee')) => g°ea € EUfoe* \ i(e t s<>ea)),
then /o8 € <p\
Property Ml
|
T is a weaker condition than Property M for any T. This
can be checked by observing that condition (ii) of the hypothesis of
Property Ml|r implies condition (ii) of the hypothesis of Property M.
The next theorem shows that the property given above is a necessary
condition for NR-implementation.
Theorem 3: Let e = {L, N, Q} be an economy in &, and let <p be a performance
standard. If <p is NR-implementable by T in e, then <p satisfies Property
Mi\r.
Proof: By definition of NR-implementation, given T = {N, M, £}, there
exists <p' Q
<f> such that <p' is fully NR-implemented by T . Thus, for any /
3 3
e <p' there exists s
€ E (D such that / = £°s. By definition, E (D £
E (D implementable equilibrium is a refinement of Bayesian equilibrium.
Thus, the following holds for all i € N, for all e 6, for all s' € S
,
i i
£o( s\ s ) € EL(f I I°(9)) (1)
i -i I ' I
Choose a CCMO a. Next, suppose that for all i <= N, for all € 6, for all
G' = e
a
(0), for all g € EL(f I I°(9')), the following holds:
i ' i
goea e EL(f°Qa I 1(9, so0a ); (2)
1 ' i
Given (1) and (2), for all i € N, for all 9 € 8, for all s' € S , the
i i
following holds:
£o(s\ s )o9
a
€ EL (/o9a I 7(9, so9a )) (3)
i -l 1 'I
By definition of a, 9 is IT -measurable for all i e N. By IT -measurability
i i
of s , s °9 is IT -measurable for all i e N. By definition of posterior
CC 3implementable equilibrium, (3) implies that s<>9 € E (D and, therefore,
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£os°0 = foQ e E (D. By definition of full NR-implementation of <p'
,
E
3(D Q <p'. Thus, /oea € <p' and <p satisfies Property Ml | V.
The following result establishes that implementation of subsets of T
or Te is impossible even with mechanisms with no regret. The necessary
condition obtained in Theorem 3 is critical.
Theorem 4: If <p Q T w T , then <p is not NR-implementable in &
Proof: Suppose that the theorem were false. We must have the following:
NEI
for all e € 8 , there exists a game T and a finite number T such that <p
x
is NR-implementable by T in e.
Consider the economy e defined in Example 1 (see proof of Theorem 1
above). By definition of NR-implementation, for some T = {N, M, £,} in e,
3
there exists <p' Q <p such that for any / e <p' , there exists s e E (D with
£©s = /. In addition, check that in the economy e in Example 1, the
hypotheses of Property Ml|T are satisfied. Choose the CCMO a given in
Example 1. Choose 6 € {a, b, c}. Since a is a constant function which
tt OL
maps to {a} for all i, 8 and, therefore, s°9 are constant functions.
Hence, we have {a) = I°(e
a
(9)) and J (e, s°9
a
) = I°{G) for all i. Thus,
the satisfaction of the hypotheses of Property M implies the satisfaction
of the hypotheses of Property Ml
|
T. Since <p fails to satisfy the
conclusion of Property M, it must violate Property Ml
|
T. By Theorem 3, <p
is not NR-implementable by any T in e. Hence, we have a
contradiction.
6. An Ex Post Approach to No Regret
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Presumably, there are other natural ways of modelling mechanisms with
no regret. In this section, we ask whether the negative results obtained
earlier can be changed to positive ones if we were to strengthen the
equilibrium concept to require optimality of strategies ex post. If
positive results remain beyond reach using this extreme notion of no
regret, we may expect other approaches to be unsuccessful as well.
The notion of an ex post Nash equilibrium has been used in the
literature (d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1982), Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983) and, especially, Cremer and McLean (1985)) to capture a notion of no
regret that is independent of the means of refining the natural information
sets. It is defined as follows.
Definition 13: s € S is an ex post Nash equilibrium of V = {N, M, £,} if Vi
e n, ve € e, vs' € s
,
i 1
S°(s', s ) € EL($o S (6».
I -I 1 '
4 4
Let E (D denote the set of ex post Nash equilibria of T and E (D = <^»s €
F: s e E
4
(n, T = {N, M, £».
Observe that £4(D Q £3(D = £2(D £ E°(D £ E l {V).
F F F F F
Definition 14: A performance standard <p is ex post No regret-implementable
(ex post NR-implementable) by T in e = (L, N, 0} if * E (D £ <p.
A performance standard <p is ex post NR-implementable (in a global
sense) if Ve e &, 3r such that <p is ex post NR-implementable by T in e.
4
Correspondingly, <p is fully ex post NR-implementable by V in e if E (D =
Next, we provide a third property of performance standards.
Definition 15: A performance standard <p satisfies Property M2 if the
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following is true:
3<p'
€ $ such that <p' Q <p and V/ € F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / <= <p'
(ii) vi € N, vg € F, ve € e, ve' = e^e;, g € EL(f I i°(e'); =» g°9a e
1 ' i
EL(f°ea I <e>;,
i
'
then /o8 € <p\
The property M2 is a weaker condition than Property M. If there
exists T with s € £ (D satisfying £os € <p, then M2 is a weaker than Ml | T
as well.
The following result shows that the property defined above is a
necessary condition for ex post NR-implementability.
Theorem 5: Let e = (L, N , &} be an economy in 6, and let <p be a performance
standard. If <p is ex post NR-implementable by F in e, then <p satisfies
Property M2.
Proof: By definition of ex post NR-implementation, given T = {N, M, £},
there exists <p' Q <p such that <p' is fully ex post NR-implemented by r.
2
Thus, for any / e <p' there exists s € E (D such that / = £°s. By
4 o
definition, E (T) Q E (D. Hence, the following holds for all i e N, for
all 9 € G, for all s' e S
,
i i
£o(s\ s ) e EL(f I J°(9)) (4)
i -l i ' i
Choose a CCMO a. Next, suppose that for all i € N, for all 9 e 6, for all
9' = 9
a
(9), for all g € EL (f \ ie'}), the following holds:
goQa e EU/°9a | {9}; (5)
Given (4) and (5), for all i e N, for all 9 € 9, for all s' € S , the
1 i
following holds:
^o(s j, she* € ELyoQ* | (e» (6)
24
By definition of a, is IT -measurable for all i € N. By IT -measurability
of s
, s °Q is IT -measurable for all i € N. By definition of ex post Nash
equilibrium, (6) implies that s°B € E (D and, therefore, £«s°0 = foQ <=
4 4
E (D. By definition of full ex post NR-implementation of <p\ EAT) Q <p\
Thus, f°Q € q>' and <p satisfies Property M2.
The next result shows that the negative results obtained earlier
persist even if the equilibrium concept employed were strengthened to ex
post Nash equilibrium. The necessary condition established in Theorem 5 is
critical.
i e NEI
Theorem 6: If <p Q T u T , then <p is not ex post NR-implementable in &
Proof: Suppose that the theorem were false. We must have the following:
NEI
for all e € 8 , there exists a game T such that <p is NR-implementable by
r in e.
Consider the economy e defined in Example 1 (see proof of Theorem 1
above). By definition of NR-implementation, for some T = {N, M, £} in e,
4
there exists <p' Q <p such that for any / € <p* , there exists s € E (D with
£°s = /. In addition, check that in the economy e in Example 1, the
hypotheses of Property M2 are satisfied. Choose the CCMO a given in
Example 1. Choose € {a, b, c}. Since a is a constant function which
OL
maps to {a} for all i, is a constant function. Hence, we have {a) =
I (0 (0)) for all i. In addition, the following relations imply that if g
e EL(f
|
I°(Q
a
(e)), then g € EL(f
\
{6}) for i = 3, 4. For the remaining
agents the relevant relationships hold trivially.
x + y £ x' + y' => 0.25(x + y ) £ 0.25(x' + y')33 33 33 33
x + y a x' + y' »* 0.75(x + y ) > 0.75(x' + y')
3 ^3 3 J 3 3 J 3 3 ^3
25
x + y > x' + y' =» 0.75(x + y ) £ 0.75(x' + y')44 44 4", 4 44
x + y 2: x' + y' => 0.25U + y ) £ 0.25(x' + y')
4 ^4 4 J 4 4 ^4 4 -/ 4
Thus, the hypotheses of Property U2 are met. Since <p fails to satisfy
the conclusion of Property M, it must violate Property M2. By Theorem 5, <p
is not ex post NR-implementable by any T in e. Hence, we have a
contradiction.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have demonstrated the impossibility of
Bayesian-implementing performance standards that satisfy interim individual
rationality-efficiency or interim fairness. We have also developed a
theory of cheap play and mechanisms with no regret. Such mechanisms
provide for information leakage during play and also have refined
equilibrium sets. However, they do not realize the positive results that
may be obtained under complete information.
A careful reading of the construction of the counter-example used in
the paper suggests that the non-implementability conclusion is not
necessarily limited to a small sub-domain of economies. In addition, the
conclusions obtained using ex post Nash equilibria also suggests that
alternative specifications of mechanisms with no regret may not help
either.
The cheap play equilibrium notion may prove to be useful in other
contexts where renegotiation and preliminary play of non-binding strategies
is natural. This shall be a subject for future research.
This paper was driven by the intuition that a combination of
26
information leakage and equilibrium refinement may recover efficiency that
was unachievable due to incompleteness of information. Equilibrium
refinement based on elimination of dominated strategies have, however,
shown positive results (see Palfrey and Srivastava (1987b) and Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (1988)) for the case of private values environments. These
results, do not allow for iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Equilibrium refinement via information leakage would seem like an
attractive alternative. In this context, it is also a very natural one.
We have shown that such an alternative may not be available to achieve our
goals.
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